By Harry Tomany
In earlier installments of this introductory series to some of Wittgenstein’s ideas, we have already started to see the importance of rules in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Grammatical propositions, and more broadly grammar itself, are rules or norms for the use of words. These are not only apt for describing and understanding the workings of language, but are, arguably, the domain in which philosophy itself operates. For the investigation of philosophical questions and problems will involve examining these norms, that is, the essence of our concepts. These norms, we have seen, antecede being able to say what is true or false; for it is only by learning a language, and thus following these norms, that one is able to say anything at all (we can only assert meaningful descriptions when we can use language to a sufficient degree).
Rules occupy an important role in all stages of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophies, although the concept itself becomes a focus as his philosophy develops; indeed, arguably one of pivotal developments in his philosophy is his changing understanding of rules. The investigation of both some of the details, and general understanding, of the functioning of language, for a variety of reasons, was a focus for Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical work. Most generally, it was an examination of language that Wittgenstein saw as the key to answer philosophical questions. Thus, even when he is investigating other areas of philosophy, these investigations very often involve either applications from his philosophy of language or implications for it. With the philosophy of language occupying such a central role, rules often do too, since it through rules, or, as his conception of rules evolves and changes, also normativity, that he is able to understand language.
Rules occupied Wittgenstein’s thinking before his investigation of normativity more generally. In his early philosophy (that he came to reject), for language, and representation generally, to be possible, one must follow rules. But, in this case, these ‘rules’ did not even need to be known; indeed, many of them were merely assumed to exist by Wittgenstein, with no actual examples being given. We all follow these ‘rules’ of ‘logical syntax’, but the conscious knowledge – and representation – of even just some of them depends on the philosopher-logician. Only he can make any of these rules at all explicit. And, even then, for those rules that the philosopher-logician can make explicit, none would be understood by the common man (they require knowledge, and application, of a special logical notation). As Wittgenstein’s later philosophy developed, it was necessary to examine the concept of rule itself in more detail.
Rules – resembling what we ordinarily understand by this term – start to take on a more prominent role in Wittgenstein’s early intermediate period (when he returns to doing philosophy after a lengthy break). Already here, Wittgenstein thinks sense can be delimited from nonsense by means of making the rules of language perfectly explicit. This is done through straightforward expression of these rules in sentences, or through ‘perspicuous’ representations of these rules (e.g. a colour octahedron). The ‘system’ of rules Wittgenstein envisions on the model of a calculus. It is the sum total of these rules, and the ‘contrasting’ nature of the rules (e.g. certain concepts can be applied to colours that can’t be applied to sounds) that gives meaning to our signs; indeed, it is the sign’s place in this system of rules that is its meaning. Although this idea of a rule is beginning to look like our own, it is noteworthy that even here Wittgenstein still has an idea of making rules explicit or clearer, an idea that is called into question in his later philosophy (along with the calculus conception involved in this understanding of rules – not dealt with further here).
Wittgenstein’s detailed comments on rules in his magnum opus, the Philosophical Investigations, emphasizes the normative aspect to rules and rule-following (for the following brief general characterization of rules in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, I am indebted to the work of P.M.S. Hacker, especially the essays ‘Rules and grammar’ and ‘Following rules, mastery of techniques, and practices’, which also serves as excellent further reading). Wittgenstein comes to understand that a necessary feature of a rule – which also applies to other concepts – is its use. To understand a rule, we must look at its role in our life. This brings into focus the normative aspect of rules and rule-following. Rules are standards of correctness. It is by means of rules that we evaluate, judge, guide, teach, criticize, correct, and so on, our actions and behaviour. The ‘hardness’ of many rules of language (or mathematics), their seeming inexorable status, lies not in the depth or transcendence of their description (they don’t describe at all!), but in how we use them. The concept of a rule is interconnected with the concept of following a rule, for knowing and understanding what counts as accord with a rule is to understand the rule. A rule would not be the precise rule it is without the acts that count as being in accord with it; there is an internal relation between a rule and acts that accord with the rule.
Rules and rule-following would not be possible at all without a background of complex abilities and practices. It is only a being that is capable of refraining from following a rule that can be said to follow a rule. Moreover, one must be capable of understanding a rule and forming the intention to follow a rule in order to be said to follow a rule; one must be capable of justifying, guiding, correcting, etc. one’s actions by reference to a rule. Thus, it is unsurprising that rules will also often be cited as reasons for action (as opposed to causes). And these abilities are only possible against the background of complex normative practices; to be able to do all of these things only makes sense in the context of these practices – which emphasizes that these are exemplified repeatedly in ordinary life. Just as it is only possible to say of someone that they are playing chess if they are familiar with the practice of chess, ‘rules’ without the requisite normative activities that accompany them are not rules. This is also the reason for why a rule can’t be followed only once, on a single occasion. More generally, being able to say someone has followed a rule requires looking to the circumstances that surround a particular act (which includes abilities, practices, and the mastery of techniques – these clearly interrelate). This separates merely moving a piece on a chess board in accord with the rules of chess (e.g. accidentally or because one was instructed), from learning to play the game (where one can begin to be described as ‘playing chess’) or playing it expertly.
With this complex understanding of the normative dimension of rules, Wittgenstein came to reject his earlier conceptions of them. There can be no such thing as hidden rules, discovering rules, or making rules more explicit (in contrast to working out the consequences of rules (e.g. in chess), or empirically discovering some of the consequences of rules (e.g. the consequences of a certain welfare policy), or making a rule clearer (i.e., either making the rule-formulation clearer or formulating the rule in such a way as to avoid ambiguity or emphasize a priority, etc.)). To know or understand a rule, to follow a rule, is to be able to use it in the normative ways described above. The use of a rule is immanent in our practices, not transcendent. They are readily apparent, transparent to view. This has consequences for much modern-day theorizing about language and the mind. A rule that is not immanent, that plays no normative role in our practices, is not a rule at all. For example, a ‘depth grammar’ for any possible language cannot be a system of rules; and there cannot be rules found in the mind or the brain. In future installments of this column, we will further examine some of Wittgenstein’s reflections on rules and their implications for modern philosophical theorizing.